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Abstract—Wireless networking opens up many opportunities
to facilitate miniaturized robots in collaborative tasks, while the
openness of wireless medium exposes robots to the threats of
Sybil attackers, who can break the fundamental trust assumption
in robotic collaboration by forging a large number of fictitious
robots. Recent advances advocate the adoption of bulky multi-
antenna systems to passively obtain fine-grained physical layer
signatures, rendering them unaffordable to miniaturized robots.
To overcome this conundrum, this paper presents ScatterID,
a lightweight system that attaches featherlight and batteryless
backscatter tags to single-antenna robots to defend against Sybil
attacks. Instead of passively “observing” signatures, ScatterID
actively “manipulates” multipath propagation by using backscat-
ter tags to intentionally create rich multipath features obtainable
to a single-antenna robot. These features are used to construct
a distinct profile to detect the real signal source, even when the
attacker is mobile and power-scaling. We implement ScatterID on
the iRobot Create platform and evaluate it in typical indoor and
outdoor environments. The experimental results show that our
system achieves a high AUROC of 0.988 and an overall accuracy
of 96.4% for identity verification.
Index Terms—Multi-robot network, Sybil attack detection,
backscatter
I. Introduction
The development of wireless technologies has promised
to facilitate effective collaboration among a team of small
and agile robots, which enables a broad range of intriguing
applications, such as surveillance [1], consensus [2], and search
and rescue [3]. Although the openness of wireless medium
delivers on the promise for efficient and agile collaboration, it
also exposes robots to cyber attacks. A particular detrimental
attack in multi-robot networks is the Sybil attack, which easily
breaks the fundamental trust assumption in robotic collaboration
by forging a bunch of fake identities to gain a disproportionate
influence in the network [4].
However, due to the ad hoc, dynamic, and miniaturized
characteristics of robotic platforms, the Sybil attack mitigation
in multi-robot networks still remains to be a challenging
issue. Traditional pre-shared key (PSK) management schemes
presume prior trust among network nodes [5], [6], which are
difficult to implement in ad hoc robotic networks where robots
often go in and out. Alternatively, research efforts [7], [8], [9],
[10], [11], [12] measure received signals strength indicator
(RSSI), channel state information (CSI) and angle of arrival
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Fig. 1. Illustration of Sybil attacks in a multi-robot network.
(AoA) features in wireless physical layer (PHY) to verify the
spatial uniqueness of each node. However, RSSI and CSI based
techniques [7], [8], [9], [10] not only need collaboration among
multiple receivers or antennas, but also require all nodes to
be stationary or semi-stationary. Although fine-grained AoA
signatures can be extracted to detect nodes in close proximity
under dynamic channels [11], [12], these approaches either
rely on large multi-antenna arrays [11] or require unnecessary
robotic motions, such as in-place spin with two antennas [12].
They are ill-suited to a team of robots individually with limited
payload and hardware capabilities.
In this paper, we argue that the fundamental hurdle in
realizing lightweight Sybil-resilient solutions lies in that these
RF-based innovations focus on passively “observing” signal
propagation signatures, which require bulky multi-antenna
systems to capture fine-grained information. This paper explores
a new approach: can we instead actively “manipulate” multipath
propagation, to make conventionally multi-antenna-exclusive
signatures also obtainable to a single antenna? If we could alter
multipath propagation by just attaching several featherlight and
batteryless backscatter tags to existing single-antenna robots,
it would not require any hardware modification or incur load
burden to the robots.
Toward this end, we present ScatterID, a lightweight system
that attaches backscatter tags to single-antenna robots to defend
against Sybil attacks. Our fundamental insight is that when
backscatter tags communicate by intermittently absorbing and
reflecting ambient signals, the multipath between a pair of
transceivers changes correspondingly [13]. Such fast changes,
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i.e., reflections from tags, provide unique spatial properties
of the communication pair. In particular, backscattered signal
strengths are highly correlated to distances between transceivers
with respect to tags. By affixing several tags on a robot, as
shown in Fig. 1, other robots’ trajectory information can be
conveyed in backscattered signal traces. The spatial correlation
indicates that similar backscatter signatures come from the same
moving robot with a high probability. In this way, a ScatterID
robot can leverage backscatter tags to extract unforgeable PHY
IDs for discriminating between legitimate robots and Sybil
attackers.
We realize the above idea by tackling the following two
challenges.
1) How to exploit backscatter tags to construct sensitive
signal profiles for hardware-constrained and dynamic robots?
With merely one antenna, a robotic platform cannot acquire
fine-grained signal signatures, such as AoA, for reliable
attack detection in dynamic channel states. To deal with
this challenge, we take sequential backscatter signatures of
each robotic transmitter as a signal profile to characterize
its long-term spatial information. Specifically, when hearing
data transmission from a surrounding robot, a ScatterID robot
controls its tags to reflect wireless signals in turn. These
backscattered signals are unique to the transmitter’s location.
In this way, the ScatterID robot continuously reflects a series
of transmissions to obtain a signal profile that is sensitive to
the transmitter’s trajectory.
2) How to effectively measure the similarity between signal
profiles under power-scaling attacks? In order to emulate
different robots, a Sybil attacker can scale its transmission
power with a varying coefficient for each identity, which
consequently leads to different signal profiles. To defend against
such an attack, we propose an effective algorithm for scaling-
resilient similarity measurement. In particular, it first normalizes
each signal profile to mitigate the scale coefficient. Then, it
leverages an adjusted cosine metric to effectively measure
the distance between two normalized profiles. Based on the
measured distances, a logistic regression model is exploited to
learn two similarity probabilities for a pair of robots. If both
two probabilities approach one, the robotic pair are very likely
forged by the same robot.
Summary of Results. We implement our system using
iRobot Create robots, GNURadio/USRP B210 and backscatter
tags using commercial off-the-shelf circuit components, and
extensively evaluate our system in typical indoor and outdoor
environments. The evaluation results show that our system
achieves a high area under the receiver operating characteristic
curve (AUROC) of 0.988 and an overall accuracy of 96.4%
for identity verification. Moreover, it can successfully detect
97.6% of fake robots and meanwhile mistakenly reject just
5.1% of legitimate robots.
Contributions. The main contributions of this work are
summarized as follows. First, we show that featherlight and
batteryless backscatter tags can be exploited to create fine-
grained PHY features, which are obtainable to single-antenna
robots and thus offer a compelling alternative to the ones
using bulky or specialized multiple antennas. Second, we
propose ScatterID, a lightweight system that is resilient
to mobile Sybil attackers with power-scaling ability. Third,
we implement ScatterID on commercial off-the-shelf robotic
platforms and conduct extensive experiments in indoor and
outdoor environments to demonstrate the effectiveness and
robustness of our system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces Sybil attacks in multi-robot networks and
signatures from backscatter tags for Sybil attack detection.
Section III elaborates on the system design. Implementation
and evaluation are described in Section IV. Section V gives a
literature review, followed by conclusion in Section VI.
II. Backscatter-Enabled Signatures for Sybil Attack
Detection
A. Sybil Attacks in Multi-Robot Networks
We focus on a general multi-robot network, where a team of
miniature mobile robots coordinates their actions by exchanging
information with each other in an ad hoc manner [2], [14]. In
the robotic team, each robot has limited payload and hardware
capabilities and is equipped with only one antenna for data
transmission and reception. Moreover, all mobile robots have
distinctive moving paths in a certain environment, since multi-
robot systems are usually spatially distributed to complete
given tasks in a time-efficient way [15].
In the robotic network, Sybil attacks occur when a selfish
robot masquerades multiple fictitious robots by broadcasting
messages with different identities. The malicious robot is
considered as a Sybil attacker. With many fake identities, the
attacker can obtain more attention from neighboring robots
and further brings a disproportionate influence into the whole
network. Additionally, the Sybil attacker can launch power-
scaling attacks by varying its transmission power in purpose
to fool other robots. The robots that are not spawned are
considered as legitimate robots.
B. Characterizing Backscattered Signals
Backscatter tags can provide fine-grained PHY signatures
that contain spatial properties of a transmitter-receiver pair. In
particular, backscatter tags enable wireless communication by
intermittently absorbing and reflecting ambient radio signals,
which changes the multipath propagation between the trans-
mitter and receiver. Such fast changes are highly correlated
to the locations of transceivers with respect to tags. Since the
multipath propagation between the transceiver pair is constant,
we consider it as a compound path that is equivalent to a
direct path in free space. Hence, we can focus on the multipath
changes incurred by backscatter tags. According to Friis path
loss theory [16], the reflected signal strength Pre f lected by a
backscatter tag can be expressed as
Pre f lected =
PtGt
4pid2t
× λ
2Gr
16pi2d2r
× T (λ,Gtag,Γ), (1)
where Pt is the transmission power, dt and dr the tag’s
equivalent distances to the transmitting and receiving antennas
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Fig. 2. Backscattered signal traces reflected by two tags from one legitimate
and two fake robots.
computed based on the compound direct path, Gt and Gr
the transmitting and receiving antenna gains, respectively.
Moreover, T (·) is a function of the wavelength λ, the antenna
gain Gtag of the tag and its reflection coefficient Γ, which
indicates the amplitude ratio of the incoming signal and
the reflected signal. Based on Eq. (1), we can find that the
backscattered signal strength Pre f lected is highly dependent on
the transmission power and the relative distances of the tag in
terms of transmitting and receiving antennas.
By affixing a backscatter tag on a mobile robot, dr is a
fixed distance, and Pt and dt are only variables in the Eq. (1).
Therefore, the signal strength reflected by the tag highly
correlates with transmission power and the distance between
the robotic communication pair. With a constant transmission
power Pt, we can construct a spatial-related signature relying
on reflected signals from multiple backscatter tags.
C. Feasibility Study
To gain a better intuition, we perform a set of preliminary
experiments to verify the above idea using backscatter tags,
moving robotic platforms and USRP nodes. To avoid interfer-
ence between the carrier and reflected signals, we implement
frequency-shift backscatter tags based on recent work [17],
[18], [19]. In the experiment, we attach two tags to one USRP
node who logs backscattered signal traces in a fixed position.
We place two USRP nodes on different moving platforms
to emulate one legitimate robot and one Sybil attacker with
two different identities, respectively. Both the legitimate robot
and Sybil attacker transmit packets with the same transmission
power while moving around in different trajectories. We extract
the backscattered signal traces by two tags and plot the results
in Fig. 2.
From Fig. 2, we observe that for two fake robots, their
backscattered signal traces are nearly identical to each other.
This is because that from the same moving robot, their signals
experience similar propagation paths that are created by two
tags. Whereas, for a pair of legitimate and fake robots, their
signal propagation to backscatter tags are different due to
distinctive trajectories. Thus, their backscattered signal traces
are uncorrelated with each other. This observation verifies that
the reflected signals from backscatter tags are highly sensitive
to robotic trajectories, and can be further utilized to construct
a unique signal profile for each moving robot.
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Fig. 3. System architecture. It contains three components: Signal Profile
Construction, Profile Distance Measurement and Fake Robot Detection.
III. System Design
A. System Overview
ScatterID is a lightweight system that provides effective
resilience to Sybil attacks in multi-robot networks. To defend
against Sybil attackers, ScatterID attaches featherweight and
batteryless backscatter tags to a single-antenna robot to
reflect data packets from its neighboring robots and creates
unforgeable PHY IDs for them based on sensitive reflected
signatures. Hence, our system does not require any hardware
modification or incur much load burden to miniaturized robots.
As illustrated in Fig. 3, ScatterID takes as input consecutive
backscattered signals of other robots and outputs their identity
legitimacy. The core of our system includes three components
– Signal Profile Construction, Profile Distance Measurement
and Fake Robot Detection.
• Signal Profile Construction. This component first seg-
ments the backscattered signal from the received signal,
and then effectively extracts the reflected signals by all
tags as a multipath signature. Then, a signal profile can
be obtained as a sequence of normalized signatures for
each robot.
• Profile Distance Measurement. After profiling neighbor-
ing robots, this component measures the distance between
any two signal profiles with an adjusted cosine metric and
then outputs a distance matrix for subsequent similarity
measurements.
• Fake Robot Detection. This component leverages the
logistic regression model to estimate the similarities
between any two robots based on their measured distances.
According to a matrix of similarities, the legitimacy of
all robots can be identified.
B. Signal Profile Construction
The first step of ScatterID is to construct sensitive signal
profiles for other robots. These profiles are carefully constructed
based on a sequence of backscattered signals to provide unique
spatial properties of moving robots.
Backscattered Signal Segmentation. To update backscat-
tered signals, a ScatterID robot controls all tags to reflect data
packets sent from each robot and thereafter extracts a segment
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Fig. 4. Backscattered signal segmentation and signature extraction. The red
segment represents a backscattered signal, and the green bars indicate extracted
backscatter signatures.
of backscattered signal from received signal traces periodically.
Since the received signal may contain the component without
tags’ reflections, it is highly desirable to detect and segment
the backscattered component from the received signal.
To achieve this goal, our system first adopts a moving average
method [13] to smooth the received signal. Fig. 4 plots an
instance of a received signal and the corresponding smoothing
result. As the figure shows, such smoothing operations enable
our system to effectively remove signal noise and reliably
decode transmitted message from tags. Next, we leverage
tags’ transmitted message to determine the start and end
of backscattering in the averaged signal. Specifically, the
transmitted message is a known binary array of zeros and ones,
which are encoded in the backscattered signal to differentiate
each tag’s reflection from others. Thereby, the backscattered
component of the averaged signal and the tags’ binary array
are highly correlated. Hence, we can correlate the averaged
signal s(n) with the binary array i(n) to detect when tags begin
reflecting signals. In particular, the correlation result c(n) can
be written as
c(n) =
M∑
m=1
s(n + m − 1) × i(m), (2)
where M is the length of i(n). According to Eq. (2), c(n) has the
highest peak when the backscattered signal and i(n) completely
overlap. Thus, our system identifies the backscattering start
tstart by finding n with the maximum value in c(n). Moreover,
as the length of the backscattered signal equals to M, we can
accordingly obtain the end of backscattering as tend = tstart + M.
With tstart and tend, our system is able to accurately segment
the backscattered signal B as
B = (b1,b2, · · · ,bK), (3)
where bi is the reflected component by the ith tag and K is the
number of tags used in our system.
Signature Extraction. Now that we have picked out the
backscattered signal, we take the next step to extract a multipath
signature from it. As depicted in Fig. 4, the backscattered signal
consists of not only the tags’ reflections but also the unwanted
reflections from ambient environments. To extract reliable
multipath features from each tag, ScatterID leverages the fact
that the difference between reflected and non-reflected samples
is caused by the tags’ reflections. Therefore, by subtracting two
kinds of samples, we can effectively eliminate environmental
reflections and thereafter obtain the reflections from all tags.
Mathematically, with the backscattered signal of the ith tag bi(n),
we assume that there are N1 reflected and N0 non-reflected
samples. The reflection of the ith tag pi can be computed by
pi =
1
N1
N1∑
n=1
bi(n|re f .) − 1N0
N0∑
n=1
bi(n|non − re f .). (4)
As analyzed in Section II, the tag’s reflection pi highly
depends on the distance between the tag and signal resource.
Thus, with the assistance of multiple backscatter tags, our
system can construct a multipath signature that provides
location information of the signal resource. Formally, based on
K tags’ reflections, a multipath signature p can be expressed
as
p = (p1, p2, · · · , pK). (5)
Considering that pi ≥ 0, p is a nonnegative vector in the feature
space.
Signature Normalization. After obtaining a multipath
signature p, we proceed to normalize it to deal with power-
scaling attacks, where a clever attacker changes its transmission
power to emulate different fake robots. Specifically, according
to Eq. (1), by intentionally varying Pt in each transmission,
the attacker can manipulate p with a different scale coefficient
α for each identity. Such an operation scales the reflected
signals by all tags and further leads to a scaled signature
p′ = (αp1, αp2, · · · , αpK), which consequently renders our
system ineffective in discovering two fake robots.
To obtain an unaffected signature with respect to power-
scaling attacks, we normalize each K-dimensional vector p
via dividing it by its L2 norm ‖p‖2 and acquire a normalized
multipath signature f as
f =
p
‖p‖2
=
(p1, p2, · · · , pK)√
p21 + p
2
2 + · · · + p2K
= ( f1, f2, · · · , fK), (6)
where fi ≥ 0 is the normalized reflection of the ith tag.
This transformation can help our system eliminate the scale
coefficient α in the scaled signature p′ and therefore makes
any multipath signature resilient to power-scaling attacks.
Profile Construction. To this end, ScatterID can construct
a signal profile for each robot. Due to the mobility of both
ScatterID and neighboring robots, multipath signatures from
the same Sybil attacker may have a poor similarity. To deal
with this issue, our system periodically extracts a multipath
signature from each robot’s backscattered signal traces and
takes a sequence of successive signatures as a signal profile for
capturing its trajectory information. For fake robots forged by
the same moving attacker, their backscattered signal traces have
the same trend and are nearly identical to each other, as depicted
in Fig. 2. Hence, by characterizing long-term information, their
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Fig. 5. Illustration of the cosine distance and its adjusted version.
signal profiles will be similar to each other. Formally, a signal
profile F of each moving robot can be expressed as
F = [f1; f2; · · · ; fL], (7)
where fi denotes the ith normalized signature and L is the
number of signatures.
C. Profile Distance Measurement
After obtaining signal profiles of all robots, ScatterID
proceeds to measure distances between their profiles for
subsequent identity inference.
Distance Matrix Construction. Consider that there are N
robots who communicate with the ScatterID robot, and a set of
their signal profiles can be denoted as {F1,F2, · · · ,FN}. Based
on these profiles, we measure the distance between every two
profiles and thus obtain a distance matrix D as
D =

0 d12 · · · d1N
d21 0 · · · d2N
...
...
. . .
...
dN1 dN2 · · · 0
 , (8)
where di j is the distance measurement with respect to two
profiles Fi and F j. Since a signal profile is comprised of L
normalized backscatter signatures, ScatterID calculates the
distances between rows of two signal profiles and thereafter
outputs a L-dimensional distance vector as
di j = (d1, d2, · · · , dL), (9)
where dl = dist(fil, f jl), the distance between lth rows of Fi
and F j. Compared to a scalar distance, the distance vector
di j contains the multipath signature differences between two
moving robots within a certain period, and thus provides finer-
grained information about their long-term similarity.
Adjusted Cosine Distance. Since a distance vector d
represents the differences between two signal profiles and
is the processing unit for subsequent similarity estimation,
the distance metric dist(·, ·) in Eq. (9) should be carefully
determined. As shown in Fig. 5 (a), after the signature normal-
ization, two signature vectors pi and qi are both transformed
into unit vectors fi and gi in the feature space, respectively. Such
transformation greatly changes the lengths of two signatures
and distorts their euclidean distance, making the euclidean
metric ineffective in capturing their similarity information.
To find an effective distance metric, we observe that after
the signature normalization, although the lengths of signatures
are distorted, their directions remain unchanged. Specifically,
the directions of the normalized signatures fi and gi are
the same with those of pi and qi. Hence, instead of using
the length difference, our system leverages the directional
difference between two normalized signatures for distance
measurement. Traditionally, the cosine distance is used to
measure the directional difference between two vectors. As
depicted in Fig. 5 (a), the cosine distance between fi and gi
can be computed as
distcos(fi, gi) = 1 − cos(fi, gi) = 1 − cos θ. (10)
Generally, the cosine distance lies in an interval of [0, 2].
However, as normalized signatures fi and gi are nonnegative
vectors, their angular difference θ falls between 0 and pi/2, and
thus their cosine distance is limited to an smaller interval
of [0, 1], which provides fewer discriminative features to
differentiate two different signatures.
To address this issue, we propose an adjusted cosine distance
for effective angular distance measurement. Formally, for two
signal profiles F = [f1; f2; · · · ; fL] and G = [g1; g2; · · · ; gL]
corresponding to two robots, we define the adjusted cosine
distance between fi and gi as
distadcos(fi, gi) = 1 − cos(fi − f¯, gi − f¯), (11)
where f¯ = f1+f2+···+fLL is the mean vector of F. According to
Eq. (11), the newly defined distance is the cosine distance
between two vectors fi − f¯ and gi − f¯. As show in Fig. 5 (b),
for two fake robots, their normalized signatures, i.e., li and fi,
should be very close on the unit circle, and their adjusted cosine
distance is still too small. While for two normalized signatures
from different robots, i.e., gi and fi, the adjusted distance will
significantly enlarge their directional difference, and therefore
a greater angular distance can be obtained. Hence, the adjusted
cosine distance provides more discriminative information than
the cosine distance in profile distance measurement. Note
that since distadcos(gi, fi) = 1 − cos(gi − g¯, fi − g¯), we have
distadcos(fi, gi) , distadcos(gi, fi) and di j , d ji.
D. Fake Robot Detection
Based on the measured distance matrix D, we estimate the
similarity between every two robots and further identify fake
robots spoofed by Sybil attackers.
Similarity Estimation. Given a distance vector di j between
signal profiles of two robots i and j, we would like to have a
similarity probability si j as
si j = P(i = j|di j). (12)
Here, si j approaches 0 for two different robots and 1 for two
fake robots generated by the same attacker, respectively. We
achieve this goal by using a machine learning algorithm to
fit the conditional distribution P(·|·) in Eq. (12). In particular,
the selected algorithm needs to be computationally efficient,
because the number of distance vectors in the distance matrix
D increases as a power function of the number of robots N.
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Fig. 6. Similarity estimation. The LR model is exploited to find the decision
boundary and further estimate the similarity probability between two robots.
Besides, it should be robust to outliers incurred by robotic
movements and environmental dynamics.
To satisfy these requirements, we leverage a logistic re-
gression (LR) model to estimate the similarity probability si j
between robots i and j based on di j as
si j = g(w · di j + b), (13)
where w and b represent the weight and bias parameters, which
together determine a decision boundary in the feature space.
Moreover, g(·) is the sigmoid function, which is given by
g(z) =
1
1 + e−z
. (14)
LR is a generalized linear model, mapping the weighted result
z = w · di j + b to a score between 0 and 1 through the sigmoid
function, which is suitable in estimating similarity probabilities
between two robots. Since the signal profiles of fake robots
generated by the same attacker are similar with each other,
their distance vectors will almost have small values and locate
below the decision boundary in the feature space as illustrated in
Fig. 6. Thus, a distance vector with many small values implies
a high similarity probability and vice versa. Besides, LR is a
highly computationally-efficient algorithm, in which only linear
parameters w and b are needed to learn in the training phase.
Moreover, it also takes advantages of the sigmoid function to
overcome the unevenness of data distribution and suppress the
impact of outliers, which significantly boosts its robustness to
robotic movements and environmental dynamics.
In the training phase, we adopt the maximum weighted
likelihood estimation (MWLE) to inference the parameters w
and b. Specifically, in MWLE, the goal is to maximize its
weighted likelihood function L(w, b) with respect to w and b,
which is defined as
L(w, b) =
N∏
n=1
vn[g(zn)]yn [1 − g(zn)]1−yn , (15)
where zn = w · dn + b. Therein, N is the number of training
samples, dn a distance sample, yn ∈ {0, 1} the sample label,
and vn the sample weight. In our application, yn = 1 flags a
distance vector between two fake robots and yn = 0 a distance
vector between a different pair. Moreover, to alleviate the class
imbalance problem, we set the sample weight vn to be inversely
proportional to the number of same-label samples.
Robot Identification. After inputting a distance vector into
the LR model, we obtain a similarity probability between a pair
of robots. The closer the probability to one, the more likely the
robotic pair comes from the same moving robot. Thus, after
inputting all elements in the distance matrix D, we can obtain
a similarity matrix S for all robots as
S =

0 s12 · · · s1N
s21 0 · · · s2N
...
...
. . .
...
sN1 sN2 · · · 0
 . (16)
Recall that for two robots, their distance vectors di j and d ji
are different, thus the corresponding similarity probabilities si j
and s ji are not same, which indicates that S is an asymmetric
matrix.
Based on the similarity matrix S, we determine that two
robots i and j are spoofed by the same Sybil attacker when
si j ≥ σ and s ji ≥ σ, (17)
where σ ∈ (0, 1) is the similarity threshold for determination.
Considering that si j and s ji are two probabilities, we set the
threshold σ to be 0.5.
IV. Implementation and Evaluation
A. Implementation
As shown in Fig. 7, we implement our system using iRobot
Create robots, backscatter tags, and GNURadio/USRP B210
nodes. We prototype our backscatter tags using off-the-shelf
circuit components based on the design in [13]. Tags are
controlled by an Altera STEP-MAX10 FPGA to reflect signals
with a frequency shift of 20 MHz to avoid interference and
transmit data with a bitrate of 4 Kbps. We build a ScatterID
robot on an iRobot Create platform equipped with multiple
backscatter tags and a USRP node with a single antenna. The
USRP node is surrounded by tags at a distance of 12 cm.
Other iRobot Create platforms each equipped with one USRP
node act as Sybil attackers or legitimate robots. All robots are
configured to communicate in the 2.4 GHz ISM band.
B. Evaluation Methodology
Experimental Setup. We evaluate the performance of
ScatterID in both indoor and outdoor environments, including
an office room with a size of 4.5 m × 5.5 m and a building
rooftop with an area of 8 m × 10 m, as shown in Fig. 8. The
office room is a typical multipath-rich environment, which
contains some furniture and surrounding walls. The rooftop is
a multipath-poor area with a few walls and roof guardrails. In
our experiments, we set the ScatterID robot to update multipath
signatures every 0.6 s. In addition, to launch power-scaling
attacks, a robotic attacker can change its transmission power
for different IDs. Moreover, each robot has a different moving
path with a speed of 20 cm/s in two settings.
Dataset. In our experiments, we collect a total of four-hour
of backscattered signal traces over different days. Based on
the collected traces, we extract signal profiles of all robots
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Backscatter tags
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ScatterID robot
Legitimate/Sybil 
robot
Fig. 7. Experimental platform. It involves USRP nodes,
backscatter tags and iRobot Create robots.
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Fig. 8. Experimental environments. We run our
system in indoor and outdoor environments.
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Fig. 9. AUROCs under different profile sizes. The
red mark corresponds to the selected size.
and measure their distance vectors as described in Section III.
We obtain our dataset that includes more than 66K distance
samples. Therein, about one fifth of them are positive and
the left are negative. We randomly partition our dataset into
10 subsets and use 10-fold cross-validation for training and
testing our LR model. In each subset, samples from indoor
and outdoor environments are included.
Evaluation Metrics. We use the following metrics to
evaluate the performance of our system.
• Accuracy. It is computed as the ratio of the total number
of robots that are correctly recognized to the total number
of legitimate and fake robots.
• True positive rate (TPR). It is the ratio of the number
of fake robots that are successfully detected to the total
number of fake robots.
• False positive rate (FPR). It is the ratio of the number
of legitimate robots that are mistakenly recognized to the
total number of legitimate robots.
• Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. It is a
curve in terms of TPRs and FPRs with varying discrimi-
nation thresholds in the interval [0, 1].
• AUROC. It is defined as the area under ROC curve,
falling into [0.5, 1]. The higher the value is, the better
performance is achieved.
C. Results
Profile Size Determination. As a signal profile is an essen-
tial unit for attack detection, the first step of our experiments is
to determine its size, which is decided by K and L, the numbers
of backscatter tags and normalized signatures, respectively.
Generally, the larger the profile size is, the better performance
will be achieved by our system. However, increasing profile
size will also incur more computation complexity and time.
Thus, a small-size profile that guarantees high performance is
desired. In order to find an appropriate profile size, we record
different AUROC values when changing K and L from 2 to 4
and 16, respectively. As depicted in Fig. 9, we observe that
AUROC grows from the lowest value 0.775 to the highest
0.993 as K and L both increase. Moreover, for the number of
tags, four tags ensure that all AUROC values are more than
0.9. For the number of signatures, AUROC grows quickly at
the beginning and has marginal growth when L exceeds 10.
Therefore, we take ten successive normalized signatures from
four backscatter tags as a signal profile.
Overall Performance. Then, we report the overall perfor-
mance of ScatterID in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11. We first summarize
experimental results in indoor and outdoor environments with
respect to TPR, FPR and accuracy. Compared with the outdoor
environment, the indoor environment has much richer multipath
due to scattering and reflections from surrounding furniture
items and walls. As shown in Fig. 10, such multipath effects
make our system obtain higher TPR and FPR in the indoor
environment. However, when it comes to accuracy, our system
achieves consistent performance in two different settings. To
sum up, our system has a detection accuracy of 96.4%. In
particular, it can successfully mitigate 97.6% of Sybil attacks
and correctly recognize 94.9% of legitimate traffic at the same
time. Next, we present the ROC curve of our system. As shown
in Fig. 11, the ROC curve closely follows the left-hand border
and the top border of the ROC space and produces a high
AUROC of 0.988, which is close to the ideal case. The above
results show the effectiveness and robustness of our system in
discriminating between legitimate and fake robots.
Impact of Signature Normalization. Next, we show that
our system is resilient to power-scaling attacks, through which
an attacker can easily imitate different robots. Fig. 12 illustrates
the impact of signature normalization when attackers perform
Sybil attacks with and without varying transmission power.
As shown in Fig. 12, we observe that in the power-scaling
scenario, the signature normalization can significantly improve
TPR by approximately 20% while reducing FPR by about
2%. This is because in each transmission, backscattered signal
strengths are proportional to the transmission power, and thus
the varying coefficient can be eliminated via normalization
operations. However, in the non-power-scaling scenario, the
normalization operation has no significant impact on both TPR
and FPR. Moreover, with signature normalization, our system
achieves comparable performance in both power-scaling and
non-power-scaling scenarios. Based on the above observations,
we conclude that our system is robust to Sybil attackers with
power-scaling ability.
Impact of Distance Metrics. We further check the effec-
tiveness of the adjusted Cosine distance in profile distance
measurement. To this end, we compare the proposed distance
  TPR FPR Accuracy 
Indoor 98.1% 5.8% 96.4% 
Outdoor 96.9% 4.0% 96.3% 
Overall 97.6% 5.1% 96.4% 
Fig. 10. System performance in indoor
and outdoor environments.
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corresponding AUROC reaches to 0.988.
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with traditional metrics, i.e., Manhattan, Euclidean, Chebyshev
and Cosine distances, and plots the results in Fig. 13. We can
observe that Manhattan, Euclidean and Chebyshev distances
show similar performance with a TPR of about 98% and a
FPR of more than 14% each. Despite the relatively high TPRs,
their FPRs are very high too, which makes them inapplicable
in reliably recognizing legitimate robots. Moreover, the FPR
corresponding to cosine distance is more than 20%. The reason
is that the cosine distance is limited to [0, 1] in our application
and thus provides less discriminative information between two
different profiles. However, the adjusted cosine distance enables
our system to achieve not only a relatively high TPR of 97.6%
but also a low FP rate of 5.1%. This is due to the fact that
the adjusted cosine distance reliably enlarges the difference
between a pair of different profiles, while it has nearly no
impact on similar profiles. Thus, the adjusted cosine distance
is an effective metric in profile distance measurement.
Impact of Machine Learning Algorithms. Finally, we
present the benefits of adopting the LR model in our system.
We compare LR with other learning models by considering
binary classification performance as well as computational
overhead for each distance sample, and report the results in
Fig. 14 and Fig. 15, respectively. In the experiment, the baseline
models are comprised of naive Bayes (NB), decision tree (DT),
support vector machine (SVM) and random forest (RF). As
shown in Fig. 14, all models exhibit negligible differences
in FPRs and all of them are lower than 0.04. However, LR,
SVM and RF have high TPRs of more than 0.92, and the
TPRs of the other two models are below 0.9. When it comes
to computational overhead, as depicted in Fig. 15, LR, NB
and DT are computational-efficient and have the same level of
training and testing time, less than 0.01 ms in both training
and testing phases. However, SVM and RF are time-consuming
models, which incur an order of magnitude higher computation
time, especially in the training phase. By taking above two
factors into consideration, we conclude that LR model is most
suitable in our application.
V. Related Work
Multi-Robot Networks. Recent years have witnessed the
proliferation of multi-robot networks in many emerging
applications such as surveillance [1], exploration [20] and
coverage [21], [22]. In these applications, one of the key
research issues is how to effectively cooperate among robots
in order to achieve a high quality of overall performance.
However, effective cooperation is based on the assumption that
all claimed identities are accurate and trustful, which can be
easily undermined by Sybil attacks.
Backscatter Communications. Nowadays, backscatter has
become one of the most energy-efficient communication
primitives. In [13], ambient backscatter is originally proposed
to facilitate two simple and batteryless tags to communicate
with each other by reflecting ambient radio signals from
surrounding TV towers. After that, a variety of novel techniques,
such as WiFi backscatter [17], FS backscatter [23], FM
backscatter [19] and LoRa backscatter [24], are successively
developed to achieve high energy efficiency. Beyond their
benign uses, backscatter has increasingly been used in other
applications such as on-body device authentication [25] and
object tracking [26]. In [27], backscatter tags are used to
shield static Internet of Things (IoT) networks from spoofing
attacks, where attackers try to masquerade other legitimate
nodes. Differing from the prior work [27], we consider Sybil
attacks in dynamic robotic networks and provide effective
resilience to power-scaling attacks.
Sybil Attack Mitigation. Sybil attacks have been widely
considered in multi-node networks [4], [10]. The past solutions
on Sybil attack mitigation are mainly falling into two categories.
(i) Cryptographic-based approaches [5], [6] assume prior trust
among network nodes and require computationally expensive
PSK management schemes. These requirements, however,
cannot be satisfied in ad hoc and miniaturized robotic platforms.
(ii) Non-cryptographic approaches [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]
use wireless PHY information to discriminate between real
and fake nodes without the assumption of mutual trust and
excessive computational overhead. However, these approaches
passively observe PHY features using bulky multiple antennas
and thus do not suit to miniaturized robots with limited payload
and hardware capabilities. To transcend these limitations, our
work adopts featherlight and batteryless backscatter tags to
actively capture fine-grained multipath features and constructs
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sensitive signal profiles for Sybil attack detection.
VI. Conclusion
This paper presents ScatterID, a lightweight system against
Sybil attacks for networked and miniaturized robots in many
cooperative tasks. Instead of passively measuring PHY features
using bulky multiple antennas, ScatterID utilizes featherlight
backscatter tags to actively manipulate multipath propagation
and creates salient multipath features obtainable to single-
antenna robots. These features are used to identify the spatial
uniqueness of each moving robot, even under power-scaling
dynamic attacks. We implement our system on commercial
off-the-shelf robotic platforms and extensively evaluate it in
typical indoor and outdoor environments. The experimental
results show that ScatterID achieves a high AUROC of 0.988
and an overall accuracy of 96.4% for identity verification. In
addition, it can successfully detect 97.6% of fake robots while
mistakenly rejecting just 5.1% of legitimate ones.
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